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Abstract—In recent years, traditional cybersecurity safeguards
have proven ineffective against insider threats. Famous cases
of sensitive information leaks caused by insiders, including the
WikiLeaks release of diplomatic cables and the Edward Snowden
incident, have greatly harmed the U.S. government’s relationship
with other governments and with its own citizens. Data Leak
Prevention (DLP) is a solution for detecting and preventing in-
formation leaks from within an organization’s network. However,
state-of-art DLP detection models are only able to detect very
limited types of sensitive information, and research in the field has
been hindered due to the lack of available sensitive texts. Many
researchers have focused on document-based detection with
artificially labeled “confidential documents” for which security
labels are assigned to the entire document, when in reality only a
portion of the document is sensitive. This type of whole-document
based security labeling increases the chances of preventing
authorized users from accessing non-sensitive information within
sensitive documents. In this paper, we introduce Automated
Classification Enabled by Security Similarity (ACESS), a new
and innovative detection model that penetrates the complexity of
big text security classification/detection. To analyze the ACESS
system, we constructed a novel dataset, containing formerly
classified paragraphs from diplomatic cables made public by
the WikiLeaks organization. To our knowledge this paper is the
first to analyze a dataset that contains actual formerly sensitive
information annotated at paragraph granularity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Drawing a line between security and convenience that
separates users’ rights from the misuse of data has never been
without complication. A common industrial and academic
approach is to quantify and limit the amount of sensitive
information revealed to insider threats – i.e., legitimate but
potentially malicious users[1], [2]. However, this approach
does not scale well with information explosion, which makes
the information leak prevention problem considerably more
difficult. Data sizes are expanding exceptionally every year.
Gantz et al. [3] stated that more than 2.8 trillion gigabytes of
data were generated in 2012 alone. Undoubtedly, among the
vast amount of newly generated data, some sensitive infor-
mation will simply go unlabeled, and a malicious or unaware
user might leak unlabeled, sensitive information without being
noticed. Concerning unstructured textual data, documents may
or may not consist of a mixture of sensitive and non-sensitive
contents. Thus some form of autonomous paragraph-based
security labeling is needed to close the gap between security
requirements and data availability.
Sensitive information leakage occurs when data passes from
trusted to untrusted channels. Leading cybersecurity vendors
have started to adopt DLP [4] [5] to counter the problem
via a detection model that differentiates sensitive information
from non-sensitive information. Automated data sensitivity
detection empowers DLP with the ability to monitor users’
actions toward only particular relevant portions of sensitive
data rather than tracking all data at all times. However, many
current DLP detection models are incapable of capturing
unlabeled sensitive texts. This raises the following question:
How can we detect substantial amounts of unlabeled sensitive
texts anywhere within a network without relying on users?
Our approach in this paper addresses the issue by partitioning
a large text corpus into smaller groups of similar paragraphs
wherein multiple similarity-based classification models can be
built to predict a paragraph’s security label. The challenge that
sensitive text detection presents is that even a few words can
possess a great deal of value.
The main contribution of our research is a paragraph-level
content driven data leak detection method which we evaluate
on genuine sensitive data. The datasets that we constructed for
our evaluation are derived from U.S. diplomatic cables made
public by the WikiLeaks organization. These datasets, which
we collectively refer to as the WikiLeaks Dataset, contain
both sensitive and non-sensitive data along with paragraph-
level annotations. We are not aware of any other paper that
has experimented on WikiLeaks for both sensitive and non-
sensitive data. Unlike most prior research, which has treated
automated text security detection as a binary classification
problem, our approach more realistically performs classifica-
tion across multiple security levels. The paragraph-based clas-
sification approach that we employ in this paper is also more
practical than document-based classification, especially for
large documents and can be trivially converted to document-
based classification. Finally, note that our ACESS detection
model is built with integration into DLP systems in mind. The
remainder of this paper is structured as follows: related work
and an overview of DLP are presented in Sec. II and Sec. III.
Sec. IV details our ACESS approach. Sec. V describes the
WikiLeaks dataset. The results of our evaluations are presented
in Sec. VI. Conclusions and future work are discussed in
Sec. VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
While the use of statistical analysis to detect sensitive text
is relatively recent, several techniques have been proposed.
Katz et al. [6] employed the k-means algorithm on cosine
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similarity to cluster all the documents in a corpus regardless
of their sensitivity level. They then assigned a confidentiality
score to each document by calculating the confidential term
probability. Alneyadi et al. [7] used L1-norms [8] between n-
gram category profiles, assigning the document to the category
of shortest distance. Hart et al. [9] proposed a new training
method to overcome the problem of imbalanced data by
implementing class-specific classifiers. Gomez-Hidalgoy et al.
[10] proposed the usage of named entity recognition to detect
“sensitive” tweets.
In each of the aforementioned works, however, artificial
“sensitive documents” were constructed from publicly avail-
able sources like articles, tweets, and forums for performance
evaluations. None of these works evaluated performance with
actual sensitive information. Therefore, how well performance
on the evaluations in these works maps to performance on the
actual problem is questionable.
While we designed our ACESS system with DLP in mind,
sensitive text classification has other applications too. An obvi-
ous forensic extension is to assist in monitoring and tracking
down suspicious users post mortem. The benefit of logging
users’ activities on classified texts is extended when integrated
with Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)
solutions. SIEM collects security related logs to analyze and
correlate between security events generated from different
sources, such as firewalls and IDS [11]. Additionally, text
sensitivity classification can offer support in understanding
insiders’ behavior by emulating sensitive documents in hon-
eypots [12]. By replacing sensitive documents with similar
non-sensitive documents, a monitoring agent could collect and
analyze user behavior.
III. A PROTOTYPICAL DLP FRAMEWORK
DLP mitigates the threat of sensitive data leakage from
insiders by discovering, detecting, protecting, and monitoring
sensitive information assets residing on both network and
host components (see Fig. 1). During the discovery phase,
unlabeled data at rest is located by remotely scanning the
targeted device with a scanning agent [13]. This unlabeled data
is passed to DLP’s detection module for sensitivity assessment.
Data is then labeled according to its detected sensitivity level.
Depending on the detected sensitivity level, data is either
transmitted to untrusted channels or passed to the protection
module. The protection can protect sensitive data in a variety
of different ways and may deal differently with data in transit
and data at rest. For instance, sensitive data in transit might
be encrypted, a security officer might be alerted, or the trans-
mission might be halted. For data at rest, on the other hand,
the DLP’s protection module might perform encryption and
change access rights. Finally, the monitoring module ensures
labeling consistency and tracks users’ actions on the sensitive
data within the network. While commercial DLP solutions
are not yet standardized, they typically consist of the four
modules illustrated in Fig. 1. Our work in this paper focuses on
extending detection modules by assigning sensitivity labels to
textual data. In contrast to hard-signature detection approaches
Fig. 1: A prototypical Data Leak Prevention (DLP) framework: Data
can be discovered either through scanning end points for unlabeled
data or capturing data in transit to untrusted channels. Data is then
inspected by the detection module to determine its sensitivity level.
Common detection techniques include regular expressions, partial
matching, and exact matching. Data that is deemed non-sensitive
is normally passed to untrusted channels and non-sensitive data at
rest is marked as non-sensitive. Detected sensitive data is passed to a
protection module, which might block the transmission, generate an
alert, encrypt the transmission, or encrypt the data at rest. Detected
data is then labeled throughout the network by the monitoring module
which tracks users’ future actions with respect to data labeled as
sensitive.
which rely on keywords, regular expressions, exact matching
and partial matching [13], our approach seeks to infer a more
general statistical model to better accommodate previously
unseen unstructured texts.
IV. LEARNING THE SECRETS
Fig. 2: A schematic representation of the ACESS model. In the first
phase, a feature space representation is learnt from real labeled para-
graphs for each cluster. Paragraphs are assigned to clusters based on
their similarities, and a classification model is generated from each
similarity cluster. In the second phase, documents discovered by the
DLP’s discovery module are passed to the closest similarity cluster;
the classifier learnt for that cluster is used to assign sensitivity level.
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A schematic overview of our ACESS system is presented
in Fig. 2. ACESS is a paragraph-based security detection
model. Unlike document-based classification, the classifier is
built and evaluated on paragraphs independently, regardless
of their documents’ origins. Research (e.g., [14]) suggests
that for a large text corpus such as the WikiLeaks dataset, it
can become difficult to differentiate actual security features
from spurious similarities brought about by large and diverse
paragraphs. We hypothesize that a solution to this problem is
to partition the dataset into multiple smaller sets of similar
paragraphs and build a classifier for each set. This approach
also has the advantage of producing smaller sets of features
to examine for each classifier, allowing for a more principled
selection of security features. One way to do this is to group
similar paragraphs together using clustering algorithms. Each
similarity cluster and its associated security feature set can
then be used to build a Similarity-Based Classification Model,
wherein each similarity cluster is treated as a small dataset
extracted from the original, large dataset.
The optimal number of clusters is indeterminate a priori
and impacts the final detection rate. One way to determine
this number is through cross-validation on the training set,
evaluating the number of clusters across a broad range. The
Group of Similarity Clusters is a representation of the dataset.
Dataset representations, or Group of Similarity Clusters, are
independent of one another. Classification Model Group is the
set of similarity-based classification models generated from
the same Group of Similarity Clusters. Finally, the Optimal
Classification Model Group is the Classification Model Group
that achieves the highest accumulative F-Measure. Another
approach would be to use a held-out validation set.
A. Generation of Collection of Groups of Similarity Clusters
ACESS’s approach to generating the group of similarity
clusters is expressed algorithmically in Alg.1, and can be
described in three steps:
1) Preprocessing: During preprocessing, tokenization is
first applied, using white space as a delimiter. Punctuation
and special characters are then removed, and all characters
are converted to lowercase. Finally, stop-words are deleted.
2) Indexing and Defining Similarity Features: Tokens are
vectorized and transformed to normalized term frequency-
inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) values. By thresholding
TF-IDF values and running validation a selected subset of the
TF-IDF features can be used to define a similarity space for
clustering paragraphs.
3) Group of Similarity Clusters: The number of produced
clusters varies depending on the size of the dataset. In this
approach, we assumed that there is one cluster for every hun-
dred paragraphs. Several algorithms can be used for clustering,
but ACESS uses the k-means algorithm [15]. The number of
clusters (k) is selected via validation and based on the criterion
that there be at least two security classes in each cluster.
If the latter condition is not met, the number of clusters is
decremented until all clusters meet this condition. A collection
of groups of similarity clusters is generated with the same set
of similarity features. The entire generation process is outlined
in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Generation of Collection of Groups of Similarity Clusters
1 Preprocessing Function()
3 Input : Labeled Paragraphs
5 for each paragraph do
6 Tokenize Paragraphs;
8 Remove Special Characters;
10 Remove Stop-Words;
12 Convert letters to lower case;
13 end
14 Vector f ← All unique features;
15 Transform f to Normalized TF-IDF values;
16 k ← Maximum allowed # of similarity clusters;
17 p← 0.6;
18 Vector v ← p× f (Features);
19 K-Means Algorithm()
21 Input : (k, v, Processed paragraphs)
23 Output: k similarity clusters
24 if each cluster in k has at least 2 classes then
25 repeat
26 Generate k − 1 similarity clusters
27 until k < 2;
28 else
29 if p>0.01 then
30 p = p− 0.1;
31 goto 18
32 else
33 k = k − 1;
34 goto 17
35 end
36 end
B. Similarity-Based Classification Models
Fig. 3 describes the overall process required to construct
similarity-based classification models from similarity clusters.
Each cluster within the group is used to train its own separate
classification model. Instances are preserved in their original
form without any preprocessing. The following is performed
on every group of similarity clusters to determine the best
set of models. As in any text classification, a preprocessing
identical to the one illustrated in subsection IV-A1 is first
applied to the paragraphs.
1) Indexing and Security Features Selection: Tokens gen-
erated in the preprocessing procedure are vectorized and
weighted with non-normalized frequency values. Through ex-
haustive experimenting, we found that TF-IDF and normal-
ization do not perform as well as term frequencies. The most
effective threshold of selected features varies among similarity
clusters; thus, determining a decisive model’s security feature
threshold requires an extensive search. We used a correlation
feature selection algorithm from the Weka toolkit [16] to
arrive at a distinct feature space representation per cluster,
ranking each feature’s value in terms of Pearson correlation
with respect to the targeted class [17]. It should be noted
that features are extracted from within a similarity cluster.
Similarity features will not hold much weight, since they are
distributed across all the security classes. This will assist in
the selection of a new set of features with stronger relation to
the classes.
2) Training Classifiers and Selecting Optimal Classification
Model Group: Models are evaluated through a 10 fold cross-
validation technique to assess the prediction model perfor-
mance. Based on the selected set of security features, various
3
Fig. 3: Similarity based model generation. Left: Pre-defined sim-
ilarity clusters. Data is converted to a TF-IDF representation via
preprocessing to index the most similar cluster via the indexing
step. Security features, are used to train classifiers. The optimal
classifiers/security features are arrived at via cross-validation. At
query time, a paragraph is assigned to its nearest cluster in TF-IDF
feature space, then the features learnt for that cluster in question are
then extracted from the paragraph and passed to the that cluster’s
corresponding classifier.
similarity-based classification models can be built from a sin-
gle similarity cluster. A similarity-based classification model
that achieves the highest F-Measure score is chosen as the
predictive model. However, there are multiple similarity-based
classification models in the classification model group. Some
of those models might result in high F-measure, while others
do not perform as well. Therefore, true and false positive
and negative values of all the similarity-based classification
models within a group were summed to calculate the overall
classification model group F-Measure. The similarity-based
classification model group with the highest F-measure for all
security classes was then selected as the optimal classification
model group.
V. THE WIKILEAKS DATASET
WikiLeaks is an organization which collects and publicizes
leaked sensitive documents. The organization gained particular
notoriety when it published sensitive U.S. diplomatic cables
dated between 2003 and February 2010, the largest collection
of leaked sensitive documents distributed by the organization
to date. These cables originated from U.S. Embassies and
Consulates from around the globe, and are stored on the
WikiLeaks web page in static HTML format, mixed and sorted
by their dates of creation. By reorganizing these documents
based on their geographic locations, we were able to create
several distinct datasets of related cables – one per embassy.
We then stripped the HTML tags, and categorized each of
the paragraphs in terms of three fields: a UID consisting
of sender, receiver, and time stamp; the raw text itself; and
the classification label. We then divided classifications into
three categories: Unclassified, Confidential, and Secret. Due
to the sparsity of meta-labels, e.g., C/FORN and C/NOFORN
corresponding to whether confidential information should or
should not be shown to foreign nationals, we merged the
corresponding entries into more general classification cate-
gories, e.g., Confidential. In total, we created datasets from
the cables of four embassies: Baghdad, London, Berlin, and
Damascus. We collectively refer to these datasets as the
WikiLeaks Dataset. Statistics for each of the collected datasets
in terms of document and paragraph classifications are shown
in Tables I and II. Since classified documents may contain
paragraphs labeled across multiple security levels, we classify
each document by the highest security label across all para-
graphs.
TABLE I: Document dataset statistics. The number of instances per
sensitivity class per dataset are reported along with the number of
TF-IDF features selected.
Dataset # Documents # Unclassified # Confidential # Secret # Features
Baghdad 6586 1373 4069 1144 49118
London 1037 368 538 131 23995
Berlin 1706 719 721 266 27542
Damascus 1377 483 764 130 26077
TABLE II: Paragraph dataset statistics. The number of instances
per sensitivity class per dataset are reported.
Dataset # Paragraphs # Unclassified # Confidential # Secret
Baghdad 49955 12599 30497 6859
London 6180 2491 3003 686
Berlin 9631 4317 4439 875
Damascus 8355 2311 5173 871
Note that the number of Unclassified or Confidential in-
stances in tables I and II is always greater than the number
of Secret instances; often by an order of magnitude. Whether
this is an artifact of the existence of fewer Secret documents
in the wild or whether Secret documents are better protected
and thus harder to leak is an important question to consider
when using the WikiLeaks Dataset to evaluate a DLP system.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our proposed methodology
on the datasets described in Sec. V. For ease of repetition
and implementation, we adopt the widely used practice of
extracting TF-IDF features across each entire dataset. In an
actual deployed system, TF-IDF features would be extracted
from the training set and possibly background datasets for lan-
guage priors, e.g., large volumes of text representing common
language usage. Our evaluation, however serves as a feasibility
analysis.
A. Evaluation Metrics
We assume that all security classes – Unclassified, Confiden-
tial, and Secret – are equally important, which means that raw
accuracy numbers alone do not provide an adequate measure
due to dataset biases (cf. Tables I and II). Rather, we turn to
precision, recall, and F1-measure per-class. Where TP , FP ,
and FN are the numbers of true positives, false positives, and
false negatives respectively, these measures are defined as
Precision = TPTP+FP Recall =
TP
TP+FN
F1−Measure = 2×Precision×RecallPrecision+Recall .
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(a) Baghdad (b) Berlin
(c) Damascus (d) London
Fig. 4: Performance of ACESS and baseline algorithms for each respective embassy of our WikiLeaks dataset is reported in terms of
precision, recall, and F1-measure for unclassified (U), confidential (C), and secret (S) classes. Only ACESS has a surface plot, the depth
dimension of which is generated by varying the number of clusters (k) across a range. For all k > 1, ACESS outperforms the baseline
models.
B. Baseline
Since no previous evaluations have been conducted on
the WikiLeaks dataset, we established baseline classification
results by testing the multinomial Naive Bayes algorithm and
the multi-class 1-vs-1 linear SVM algorithm in a stratified
10-fold cross-validation. Across each fold, we conducted a
cross-validated parameter grid search across the training par-
tition, and found that the linear SVM noticeably outperformed
Naive Bayes. We also tried several non-linear kernel SVMs,
including polynomial and RBF, but found that the respective
F1-Measures were at best statistically comparable to the linear
SVM [18] – a finding which we attribute to the sparsity of the
training set and the already high dimensionality of the un-
kernelized feature space.
The feature space used for the baseline classifier was
obtained by running a correlation algorithm across term fre-
quencies for each embassy’s dataset, ranking their frequencies
by correlation, and keeping between 0.01% and 0.6% of the
features. For ACESS, we used TF-IDF features for clustering
and term frequencies to build classifiers for each cluster. Fea-
ture selection was performed independently for each cluster,
using correlation with respect to training points in the cluster.
Classifiers were built using linear SVMs since they performed
the best on the training set.
C. Results
The results of our evaluation are presented in Fig. 4. For the
two baseline classifiers, the precision, recall, and F-Measure of
each of the three classes are shown. A dimension is added to
the plot for the ACESS model, showing the number of clusters
(k in k-means) selected. For all k > 1, ACESS outperforms
both baselines.
Throughout our evaluation, we found that found that for
datasets with more instances, more clusters are required to
obtain optimal results, for example, Baghdad is the largest
of the WikiLeaks datasets that we evaluated and it achieved
“optimal” performance with 488 clusters. Berlin, Damascus,
and London, respectively achieved “optimal” performance
with 82, 67, and 55 clusters. While the number of clusters
cannot be known a priori, it can likely be estimated via cross-
validation on the training set. Interestingly, the optimal number
of clusters across all datasets was strongly tied to the number
of instances in each dataset: Across all four datasets, the
optimal cluster count constituted 0.88± 0.07% of the data.
VII. DISCUSSION
The fact that ACESS outperforms the baseline algorithms
suggests that several classifiers trained in locally derived
feature spaces are more discriminative for the type of sensitive
data contained in the WikiLeaks dataset than a single mono-
lithic classifier trained in one globally learnt feature space.
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Equivalently, aggregating all paragraphs under a single TF-
IDF representation seems to attenuate the local signal. In
our evaluations we were not able to solve this through non-
linearity in the classifier alone, as kernelized SVMs did not
provide statistically significantly better performance in TF-IDF
space.
Instead, ACESS achieves superior classification perfor-
mance by using global features to direct the query to the right
cluster, then perform local, fine-grained classification using
that cluster’s feature space and decision boundary. In this
respect, clustering serves as a loose form of topic modeling,
and an alternative approach, e.g., latent semantic analysis
could perhaps be employed.
The surprising result that the optimal number of clusters
constitutes roughly the same fraction of each embassy’s dataset
leads us to hypothesize that there is similarity in topic distri-
bution / sampling across datasets. More analysis is required
to verify this hypothesis, but if it holds, several interesting
applications could be conducted – e.g., domain adaptation
between embassies and other sensitive contexts could be
made more trivial. Domain adaptation for classification of
sensitive information is an important topic in its own right,
since stakeholders might not trust a DLP developer with their
sensitive data but might still wish to use the DLP system.
Notice that in the surface plots in Fig. 4, performance noisily
tends to increase, peak, then decrease with the number of clus-
ters, corresponding to the transition from an overly-globalized
ACESS model to an overly-localized ACESS model. Over-
globalization results from too much aggregation in the local
feature spaces, while over-localization is a result of a com-
bined under-sampling in the local feature space representation
itself and a local decision boundary with too little support. In
practice, however, the superior performance that we achieve
over a broad range in number of clusters suggests that whether
slightly over-specialized or slightly over-globalized, a useful
value of k should be trivial to ascertain.
VIII. CONCLUSION
To our knowledge, the WikiLeaks dataset is the first dataset
available to the research community consisting of actual sen-
sitive information. The dataset is labeled per-paragraph, with
multiple levels of sensitivity, and we hope that it will be of
use to future researchers. Our experiments show compelling
evidence suggesting that ACESS can enhance the accuracy
of generalized machine-learnt DLP detection modules by
synthesizing both local and global feature space information.
Integrating the ACESS model into DLP Systems ensures
labeling consistency through instant detection of sensitive doc-
uments. We have proven that even with an enormous chunk of
textual information, it is possible to identify various sensitivity
levels within a document. Automating the paragraphs’ security
classification maximizes the accessibility to unclassified or
public texts that exist along with the sensitive ones.
REFERENCES
[1] Y. Chen and D. Evans, “Auditing information leakage for distance
metrics,” in Privacy, Security, Risk and Trust (PASSAT) and 2011 IEEE
Third Inernational Conference on Social Computing (SocialCom), 2011
IEEE Third International Conference on. IEEE, 2011, pp. 1131–1140.
[2] A. Harel, A. Shabtai, L. Rokach, and Y. Elovici, “M-score: estimating
the potential damage of data leakage incident by assigning misuseability
weight,” in Proceedings of the 2010 ACM workshop on Insider threats.
ACM, 2010, pp. 13–20.
[3] J. Gantz and D. Reinsel, “The digital universe in 2020: Big data, bigger
digital shadows, and biggest growth in the far east,” IDC iView: IDC
Analyze the future, vol. 2007, pp. 1–16, 2012.
[4] M. Katzer and D. Crawford, “Office 365 compliance and data loss
prevention,” in Office 365. Springer, 2013, pp. 429–481.
[5] E. Ouellet and R. McMillan, “Magic quadrant for content-aware data
loss prevention,” Gartner Group Research Note, 2011.
[6] G. Katz, Y. Elovici, and B. Shapira, “Coban: A context based model for
data leakage prevention,” Information Sciences, vol. 262, pp. 137–158,
2014.
[7] S. Alneyadi, E. Sithirasenan, and V. Muthukkumarasamy, “A semantics-
aware classification approach for data leakage prevention,” in Informa-
tion Security and Privacy. Springer, 2014, pp. 413–421.
[8] E. F. Krause, Taxicab geometry: An adventure in non-Euclidean geom-
etry. Courier Corporation, 2012.
[9] M. Hart, P. Manadhata, and R. Johnson, “Text classification for data loss
prevention,” in Privacy Enhancing Technologies. Springer, 2011, pp.
18–37.
[10] J. M. Gomez-Hidalgo, J. M. Martin-Abreu, J. Nieves, I. Santos,
F. Brezo, and P. G. Bringas, “Data leak prevention through named entity
recognition,” in Social Computing (SocialCom), 2010 IEEE Second
International Conference on. IEEE, 2010, pp. 1129–1134.
[11] K. Kent, “Guide to computer security log management,” 2007.
[12] M. L. Bringer, C. A. Chelmecki, and H. Fujinoki, “A survey: Recent
advances and future trends in honeypot research,” International Journal
of Computer Network and Information Security, vol. 4, no. 10, p. 63,
2012.
[13] R. Mogull, “Dlp content discovery: Best practices for stored data
discovery and protection,” USA: Securosis, LLC, 2008.
[14] I. Titov and R. McDonald, “Modeling online reviews with multi-grain
topic models,” in Proceedings of the 17th international conference on
World Wide Web. ACM, 2008, pp. 111–120.
[15] J. A. Hartigan and M. A. Wong, “Algorithm as 136: A k-means
clustering algorithm,” Applied statistics, pp. 100–108, 1979.
[16] M. Hall, E. Frank, G. Holmes, B. Pfahringer, P. Reutemann, and I. H.
Witten, “The weka data mining software: an update,” ACM SIGKDD
explorations newsletter, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 10–18, 2009.
[17] M. A. Hall, “Correlation-based feature selection for machine learning,”
Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Waikato, 1999.
[18] R.-E. Fan, K.-W. Chang, C.-J. Hsieh, X.-R. Wang, and C.-J. Lin,
“Liblinear: A library for large linear classification,” The Journal of
Machine Learning Research, vol. 9, pp. 1871–1874, 2008.
6
